



Market power is “the ability of firms to influence the price of 
the product or products they sell” (Martin 1989: 16). This is our 
contemporary definition. But what do we know about the history of 
this notion? What do we know about when it was defined and how it 
was explained in the history of economic thought? 
In this paper we distinguish four different fields of enquiry in 
which to seek a history of ideas on the causes of market power: the 
first concerns the history of the models of profit maximization in 
imperfectly competitive markets; the second, competition policies in a 
historical perspective; the third, the theory of competition in economic 
thought; and the fourth, the development of the notion of entry 
barriers. This paper is of an historiographical character and places this 
study within the existing panorama of the secondary literature; 
moreover, it has been written in the conviction that in the study of 
economic thought one cannot restrict oneself to simply narrating a 
history, one must also have some very good reasons for doing so. 
  
2. Fields of enquiry 
The four possible fields of enquiry in which to seek the origins 
of the notion of monopoly power are to be found within the pre-
history and history of industrial economics and competition policies. 
This is the case insofar as market power is the characteristic feature of 
all imperfectly competitive markets, so the natural place to look to 
follow its historical development is in the theory of industrial 
economics, as well as competition policies. Nevertheless, as we shall be 
seeing, also the historiography of the theory of competition will 
provide various ideas for a history of the sources of market power. 
 
2.1. The History of the Models  
The first field of enquiry in which it would seem natural to find a 
theory of the causes of monopoly power concerns the attempts to 
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calculate equilibrium prices and quantities in imperfectly competitive 
markets. The history of these attempts has been reconstructed by many 
scholars2, who all agree on the fact that it began with the work of 
Cournot (1838), followed by Dupuit (1844), Bertrand (1883), Launhardt 
(1885), Auspitz and Lieben (1889), Edgeworth (1897), Hotelling (1929), 
Chamberlin (1933) and J. Robinson (1933)3. In these models firms may 
have market power for a variety of reasons, one of which is that there 
aren’t very many of them, although the reason for their small number 
is not explained. In effect, these models do not consider entry of new 
firms, so they don’t pay much attention to the causes of market power, 
often taking them as given4. These are the reasons why the history of 
the profit maximization models in imperfectly competitive markets 
has little to say about the causes of monopoly power in economic 
thought.  
 
2.2. The History of Competition Policies  
The second field of enquiry concerns the history of the theory 
behind the two main competition policies, that is to say antitrust policy 
and regulation5. 
 
2.2.1. The History of Antitrust 
  Since the specific purpose of the firms at which antitrust 
                                                 
2 See, among others, Schumpeter (1954), West (1978), Stigler (1982), Niehans (1990), 
Ekelud and Hébert (1999), Puu (2002: 1-5). 
3 The reason why I stop at the Thirties is explained further on. 
4 Modigliani for example writes that “the impossibility of entry is frequently at least 
implicitly assumed in the analysis of oligopoly, following the venerable example of 
Cournot, with his owners of mineral wells” (1958: 216). And according to Ekelund and 
Hébert, among all the “pioneers” they cite: “Dupuit alone examined in detail the 
sources of monopoly” (1999: 19, our italics); we mentioned this in the introduction. 
Clearly, in the models of monopolistic and imperfect competition the cause of market 
power is explicitly indicated (product differentiation) (Hicks 1935). 
5 “The main instruments of competition policy are: antitrust policy, the policy for the 
efficiency of financial markets, regulation, the production of public services, the policy 
for innovations and patents” (Grillo and Silva 1989: 501, authors’italics); here we 
restrict ourselves to considering the two main ones. 
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legislation is directed is that of obtaining and enhancing their own 
market power, it would be reasonable to expect to find the history of 
the discovery of the causes of monopoly power by analyzing the 
theories that have inspired antitrust legislation over the years. The 
history of antitrust policy starting from its origins has been the subject 
of a great many studies: some of these affirm that in the first decades 
of its activities antitrust was moved more by political and social 
considerations than by economic ones6; others argue the presence of a 
strong influence of economic theory right from its very beginnings7. 
This latter position8 would involve the possibility of reconstructing the 
development of the ideas on the causes of market power by a 
comprehensive review of the theories behind the  antitrust legislation; 
however,  even if one were to accept the most extreme version of this 
position, we still wouldn’t find here the history we are looking for, for 
various reasons.  
The first of these is that antitrust does not consider the 
existence of market power illegal per se9, but restricts its interest to 
those cases in which firms, to obtain it, adopt anticompetitive 
practices10. So we cannot find in this historiography a general interest in 
the causes of monopoly power11, because its interest is limited just to 
                                                 
6 Peritz (1990) cit. in Giocoli (2009). Stigler in 1982 was still skeptical about the 
influence of the economists on antitrust policy (Stigler 1982). 
7 See, for example, Kovacic (1992) and Meese (2003).  
8 Such as for example that of Hovenkampf (1989b): “Antitrust policy has been forged 
by economic ideology since its inception” ([1991]: 136); or “The antitrust laws are … 
eternally wedded to prevailing economic doctrine (157). 
9 However, there are practices considered violations per se that it is held necessarily 
procure market power (and in fact do not require an enquiry into their existence); e.g. 
antitrust has almost always considered price agreements illegal per se, holding them to 
be clearly a cause of market power. 
10 These practices consist of: collusive behavior, mergers and takeovers, 
monopolization (in the USA) or abuse of dominant position (in Europe). Within the 
latter, practices excluding rivals take on especial significance.  
11 For example, market power which all firms inevitably enjoy through the absence of 
perfect competition in actual markets is obviously not the object of enquiry by 
antitrust, as well as the one achieved due to merit, or the one deriving from natural 
monopolies. 
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those kinds of behavior12 that generate it by restraining competition13. 
The second reason is the following: if in the evaluation of illegal 
behavior the rule of reason approach is adopted14, judgment is based on 
the principle of reasonableness, according to which it is not enough 
that an action, to be condemned, restrains competition, it also has to 
restrain it unreasonably; by adopting this approach, therefore, an 
anticompetitive practice aiming at the acquisition of market power 
that, however, restrains competition “reasonably”, would not be 
condemned. In this context the relevant causes of monopoly power for 
antitrust change according to the judgment on its reasonableness, 
which further explains why the historiography of ideas behind 
antitrust legislation cannot contain a general analysis of the causes of 
monopoly power15. 
The third reason is that the only economists who are believed 
to have influenced antitrust at its beginnings are Americans16; this cuts 
out the entire economic thought which, in the decades around the end 
of the nineteenth century in the rest of the world, focused on the 
development of a good deal of thinking on antitrust policies. 
 
2.2.2. Industrial Regulation 
Within this second field of enquiry we also need to use  
                                                 
12 The attention paid by antitrust to market share is explicable in that it is considered  
as evidence of behavior that could have illegally generated market power. 
13 And in the most recent approach this restraint also has to be “detrimental” (Motta 
and Polo 2005: xvii). A criticism of this approach is in Grillo (2006). See also the new 
approach put forward by Etro (2006). 
14 In carrying out antitrust legislation the rule of reason has been widely adopted. See 
Kovacic and Shapiro (2000). The various meanings attributed to the rule of reason in the 
history of antitrust are examined in Grillo (2006). 
15 On the relationship between the character of the violations and market power in a 
different perspective, but compatible with ours, see Krattenmaker, Lande and Salop 
(1987: 242). 
16 See the examination of the literature in Giocoli (2009); the author formulates 
convincing hypotheses on the history of antitrust in Europe, which is beyond our 
temporal horizon in that, as is well known, it has much more recent origins (the Treaty 
of Rome was signed in 1957). 
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historical perspective for the theory of regulation policies; 
nevertheless, since policies of this kind aim to intervene in industries 
characterized by natural monopoly, they are linked to just one of the 
causes of monopoly power, i.e. economies of scale, which are included 
in our reconstruction, but by no means make up the whole of it 17.  
 
2.3 The Historiography on Competition 
The third research path turns to the literature on the history of the 
notion of competition, with the idea of arriving at information 
indirectly on the non-legal sources of market power18. This is not an 
easy thing to do, both because this historiography in general does not 
raise the problem of implications for ideas about monopoly power, 
and because the two notions are not always antithetical. Only if the 
competition is characterized by perfect elasticity of the firm’s demand 
curve, is it antithetical to market power: the competition thus defined 
necessarily implies absence of monopoly power. In this case the list of 
the conditions necessary for competition provides us with all the 
information we need on the causes of market power: the latter in fact 
emerges exclusively if these conditions do not occur19. Yet as we shall 
see, the notion of perfect competition was fully defined only in the 
Thirties. Before that, competition was treated as an activity20, and to 
compete meant to undertake strategies precisely to obtain monopoly 
power, i.e. to set prices so as to make positive profits21: in this situation 
clearly there can be no antithesis between competition and market 
power.  
                                                 
17 On the history of the concept of natural monopoly starting from its origins see 
Mosca (2008). 
18 In this work we do not deal with legal sources because their recognition has never 
been problematic, being simply attributed to the government. 
19 Machovec (1995: 179-181). 
20 As a result the term was applied to any kind of market structure. See MacNulty 
(1967: 397), Backhouse (1990: 59-63), Blaug (1997: 67; 2001: 153), Bradley (2009). 
21 Which is a very different thing from assuming given prices and zero economic profit 
as in the model of perfect competition (MacNulty 1967: 399; 1968: 656). 
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On examining this literature to seek the causes of monopoly power 
we therefore have to be careful to distinguish between the two cases: 
whereas in the former the causes of market power coincide with the 
obstacles to perfect competition, in the latter the firms’ behavior to 
obtain market power does not restrain competition because it is an 
expression of it; the latter can, however, be impeded for other reasons. 
 
2.3.1. Competition in the Classicals 
We start with an examination of the literature on competition in 
the classicals to find the causes of monopoly power. Beyond the legal 
restraints, that as we have already said do not come within the range 
of our present work, the uncovering of other sources of market power, 
such as limited knowledge, collusion, imperfect factor mobility and 
inelastic supply is down to Smith (1776); in addition it is held that for 
Smith the number of rivals in a market was important for determining 
market power22. It is stated that to Bailey (1825) we owe the interesting 
analyses of “monopolies” with restricted entry and one or more sellers, 
and of the markets in which the producers have a cost advantage over 
the new entrants, where monopoly power comes up against a restraint 
on potential competition23. Senior (1836) is cited for having worked on 
the impossibility of transferring capital from one use to another 
without incurring losses, and of the unavailability of information of 
profits24; at the same time it is thought that for Senior the number of 
firms was unimportant25. J.S. Mill (1848) is remembered for having 
paid attention to consumers’ “custom”26; as for the number of firms, 
                                                 
22 Stigler (1957: 2 e 1987: 531-532) and Bradley (2009). On the contrary Blaug (1997) 
states that “only once did Smith ever mention the number of rivals involved in 
competition” (68). 
23 Backhouse (1990: 60-61). 
24 Stigler (1957: 3 e 1987: 532). 
25 Machovec, (1995: 118). 
26 Backhouse (1990: 66). Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 546), Machovec (1995: 132). L.R.P. 
(1894: 378) recalls in general that “much … of his treatise is devoted to showing its (of 
competition) limitations in practice”. 
 6
the idea is attributed to J.S. Mill, as to Smith, that “concentration will 
inevitably lead to some ‘contrivance to raise prices’ or some form of 
‘combination among dealers’”27. Cairnes (1874) is described as 
interested specifically in cases of monopoly power within his “non-
competing groups”28.  
To sum up, and in the light of the previous distinction, we can state 
that the classicals had singled out a series of causes from which they 
believed monopoly power for firms could derive: some of them 
(agreements, limited knowledge) are to be considered strategies to 
compete29, others (imperfect factor mobility, inelastic input supply, 
custom) were seen as real obstacles to the competitive process30; the 
latter were however seen as temporary, but to this we shall be 
returning. On the importance of the number of firms for competition, 
as we have seen, there was no agreement. 
 
2.3.2. Marginalist and Neoclassical Competition 
We now seek the sources of monopoly power in the literature on 
competition in marginalist and neoclassical thought31. As we shall see, 
in that age the foundations are laid of the conception of competition 
                                                 
27 Bradley (2009). 
28 Stigler (1957: 3-4), L.R.P (1987: 378), Backhouse (1990: 61). We should remember that 
Cairnes distinguished between commercial competition (within the industry) and 
industrial (between industries). We just want to point out, without suggesting any 
continuity, that if the two kinds of competition take place without friction, they 
generate the two essential results of perfect competition: single price (from the first) 
and normal profits (from the second). We are aware that Cairnes was interested in 
competitive behavior, whereas here we are highlighting the end state; nevertheless, in 
the light of later developments the relevance of the distinction he made is striking.  
29 Hart (2001) recalls for example that for the classicals “technological change was the 
natural result of economic competition” (3). 
30 We do not share the idea that in the classicals’ thinking the non-legal obstacles to 
competition were entirely absent. For example Hovenkamp (1989b) is being reductive 
when he sees in the classicals “the absence of any notion of barrier to entry” ([1991]: 
148). 
31 In the distinction between these two categories we are referring to the idea that the  
construction of the neoclassical paradigm was above all the work of the generation 
after the marginalists (Screpanti and Zamagni 1989: 6). 
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seen as a specific market structure rather than as an activity, without 
moreover abandoning the classical idea of competition as behavior 
that we have just examined. Cournot (1838), as we know, paid no 
attention to the conditions of entry, yet in the literature on competition 
he is cited for one aspect that also interests us here: his theory in fact 
establishes that if the firms are few, they have market power32. Jevons 
(1871) is remembered for his “law of indifference”33 and for his idea of 
perfect market34. Edgeworth (1881) is considered the first to list certain 
conditions without which individuals cannot compete or, in his terms, 
“recontract”: free communication35, divisibility of goods36, large 
number of sellers37. Bertrand (1883) is mentioned for price 
competition38, which makes the number of firms in the market 
irrelevant. Marshall (1890a, 1890b) is described as one who is confident 
that the “race” of competition can take place, on condition there is 
sufficient knowledge and absence of agreements 39. Hadley (1896) is 
cited for the role played by custom40, as in J.S. Mill, but above all for 
finding natural monopolies 41. J.B. Clark (1887, 1901, 1904) is 
remembered for having held that firms operating in the market were 
                                                 
32 We should remember also that it is held Cournot really believed that competition 
existed in most real markets (Stigler 1957: 5-6 e 1987: 533; Bradley 2009: 5). 
33 According to this law in a market there cannot be two different prices for the same 
good (Backhouse 1990: 66-67). 
 34 A perfect market for Jevons requires perfect knowledge and a “perfectly free” 
competition not better defined (Stigler 1957: 6). 
35 Backhouse (1990: 77). 
36 Stigler (1957: 7 and 1987: 534). 
37 Backhouse (1990: 78). 
38 Backhouse (1990: 69). 
39 Stigler (1957: 9). In general it is held that Marshall was aware that perfect 
competition requires small firms and given prices, but that he didn’t push his 
argument as far as that formulation (Peterson 1957: 72; Corley 1990: 84). In a 
marvelous passage Schumpeter gives an explanation for this, writing that Marshall 
“was bent on salvaging every bit of real life he could possibly leave in … he did not 
attempt to beat out the logic of competition to its thinnest leaf” (1954 [1976]: 974).  
40 Morgan (1993: 573). 
41 Morgan (1993: 593-594). 
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capable of preventing entry42, and even of eliminating potential 
competition43; he is also cited (J.B. Clark 1899) for having added to 
those of Edgeworth two more conditions: the instantaneous mobility of 
resources and the identification of competition with stationary 
equilibrium44. Wicksell (1901) and Moore (1906) are mentioned for 
having provided new lists of necessary conditions for competition45. 
Wicksell (1901) is also remembered for having traced the causes of 
monopoly in large overhead costs, in joint supply and in location46, 
while H.C. Adams (1918) is considered among those who believed that 
firm size was the cause of market power47. Finally, having made the 
greatest effort to set down the conditions for perfect competition is 
down to Knight (1921b)48, and it should also be noted that he didn’t 
believe in it49. It was precisely Knight who prepared the way for the 
reaction in the Thirties against the theory of perfectly competitive 
markets50 and ironically it was Chamberlin51 and Robinson52 who 
                                                 
42 Morgan (1993: 586-587). 
43 Morgan (1993): “Successful combinations, by fixing prices and production, could 
limit both real and potential competition” (587). 
44 Stigler (1957: 11). 
45 For Wicksell “There must be a uniform product, firms must be small in size and 
there must be constant returns to scale” (Backhouse 1990: 70). Moore lists five 
conditions , but “His first two items state the conditions of price uniformity and profit 
maximization. Conditions III, IV and V are stated in such a way as to create doubts 
about the distinction between premise and consequence” (Dennis 1977: 272); see also 
Stigler (1957: 9). 
46 Backhouse (1990: 70-71). 
47 DiLorenzo and High (1988: 429). 
48 Stigler (1957: 11) and Machovec (1995: 163-164). 
49 Peterson (1957: 65) for example cites J.B. Clark (1899): “a static state … is imaginary”. 
See also Stigler (1957: 11), Dennis (1977: 273-275). 
50 Stigler (1957): “It was the meticulous discussion in this work that did most to drive 
home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously defined concept and 
so prepared the way for the widespread reaction against it in the 1930’s” (11); Also 
Dennis (1977) writes: “Knight highlighted the severely abstract character of perfect 
competition in such a way that led other theorists to hunt for more plausibly realistic 
models of market behavior” (270).  
51 Peterson (1957: 76). 
52 Dennis (1977) writes: “Chamberlin [and] Robinson had to specify more precisely 
what the model of perfect competition itself entailed, so that a proper contrast could 
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perfected definitively its static notion53. The “principle of excluded 
strategy” having prevailed54, it is said that after this age every action 
undertaken to compete was considered proof of monopoly power55; 
we shall be returning to this affirmation.  
As can be seen, for the age examined here as well as for the 
classical age, we can divide the causes of market power into two 
categories: on the one hand, those due to strategic behavior 
(agreements, limited knowledge, product non-homogeneity), on the 
other, those owing to external factors (technology, indivisibility, 
inelastic input supply, custom). We also note that, as the definition of 
the conditions for perfect competition gradually proceeds, it is denied 
that those conditions can be realized56. 
In the historiography of the notion of competition there is therefore 
interesting material for a history of the causes of market power. 
Further on we shall be looking much closer at the consequences these 
ideas have had for our research; for the moment we shall restrict 
ourselves to noticing, together with most of the relevant literature, that 
in this period there were several concepts of competition, and they co-
existed side by side.  
 
                                                                                                                    
be drawn with the newer models” (270-271) and Machovec (1995) states “the 
Chamberlin/Robinson model provided the capstone for the triumph of equilibrium 
theory” (181). 
53 Also Blaug (1997) argues that the perfecting of the theory of perfect competition 
occurred in the Thirties (66-67), and adds: “Robinson and Chamberlin … created the 
theory of perfect competition in the course of inventing imperfect and monopolistic 
competition theory” (68). 
54  “The Principle of Excluded Strategy” is the colorful expression Schumpeter uses 
(1954 [1976]: 972) to indicate perfect competition. 
55 Machovec (1995): “as the neoclassical conceptions of competition and monopoly 
began to take hold, nearly every traditional means of competing came to be 
interpreted as unlawful” (180). Blaug (1997): “every act of competition … was now 
taken as evidence of some degree of monopoly power, and hence a departure from 
perfect competition” (68). 
56 Certainly this is true for the short run, as Morgan notes (1993): “imperfections in the 
market delay the effects of the working of the static laws” (589, italics added). 
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2.4. The History of the Notion of Entry Barriers 
We continue to seek explanations of monopoly power, this time 
examining the field of industrial economics, and in particular the way 
that discipline has answered the question: which factors generate 
situations in which firms have market power, i.e. in which they are 
able to set their prices57? We shall examine three periods, beginning 
with the more recent.  
 
2.4.1. From Bain to the present day 
Starting from the contribution of Joe Bain (1956) at Harvard, 
industrial economics provided an answer to our question: the causes 
of firms’ market power are entry barriers; in other words the notion of 
entry barrier was used to explain the existence of monopoly power. So 
we found the category our research was looking for in economic 
theory: entry barriers explain the presence of market power. We still 
had to ask ourselves if the history of this category had already been 
written; in actual fact, a history focused on the specific subject of the 
notion of entry barriers already exists58, and to put it briefly, is this: 
everything starts from Bain, who found entry barriers in economies of 
scale, in product differentiation or in the absolute cost advantages for 
established firms; it should be noted that for Bain entry barriers allow 
incumbents to “persistently raise their prices above a competitive level 
without attracting new firms to enter the industry” (Bain 1956: 3), so 
for Bain, profits above the normal level were signs of the existence of 
                                                 
57 For those who argue that monopoly power is generated exclusively by legal factors 
these question makes no sense. For example, certain exponents of the Chicago School 
state that “firms cannot in general obtain or enhance monopoly power by unilateral 
action” (Posner 1979: 928); the neo-Austrian School, basing itself on different 
methodological foundations, argues that: “Monopoly power … is always associated 
with legal, third-party restraints on either business rivalry or cooperation, not with 
strictly free-market activity” (Armentano 1999: 18). 
58 On entry barriers in the history of economic thought starting from Bain there are the 
very recent works of Keppler (2008) and Rosado Cubero (2008). However, the main 
information set down here can be drawn from textbooks of industrial economics. 
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entry barriers59. For our own research it is important to emphasize that 
independently of Bain, and in the same period, Sylos Labini (1957) 
studied the relation between the number of firms and market power, 
also using the concept of entry barriers 60.  
Stigler (1968), from Chicago, attacking Bain’s definition, 
defined entry barriers as a cost advantage of the firm already in the 
industry compared to those seeking to enter, thus detaching them 
from above-normal profits. With the two different definitions of Bain 
and Stigler, a controversy began61 on which concrete situations act as 
entry barriers62. From Salop (1979) onwards non-legal entry barriers 
were divided up into innocent and strategic, the former of a structural 
type, and hence exogenous, the latter activated by existing firms, and 
hence endogenous63. Basing itself on this theoretical category, 
industrial economics defined the causes of market power first 
according to the structure-conduct-performance approach64, and then, 
starting from the Eighties, to the “new industrial economics”. For the 
former, monopoly power is a function of the degree of concentration of 
                                                 
59 In this context it is worth remembering the title of an article of his "The Profit Rate as 
Measure of Monopoly Power" (Bain 1941). 
60 Sylos Labini (1957) also uses the term “barriers”, for example: “In concentrated 
oligopoly, technology creates external barriers between each group of firms and its 
potential competitors” ([1962]: 54-55 author’s italics). 
61 See for example McAfee et al. (2004), Carlton (2004), Schmalensee (2004). 
62 As well as on the usefulness of the concept. Some exponents of the Chicago School 
wholly rejected the concept of entry barrier, e.g. Bork (1978: ch. 16), Demsetz (1982) 
and Posner (1979: 929); the latter calls entry barriers “colorful characterizations”. Even 
more critical were the representatives of the Neo-Austrian School, for whom “most of 
these alleged barriers have proven to be economies and efficiencies that leading firms 
have earned in the market-place” (Armentano 1999: 13).  
63 “I have assembled … some 14 sources of entry barriers which the literature has 
identified. They derive both from “exogenous” causes (that is, basic conditions such as 
technology) and “endogenous” conditions (that is, voluntary actions taken by the 
incumbent firms so as to make entry harder)” Shepherd (1995: 303). 
64 Some (for example Shepherd 2007: 209) hold that we owe this approach to Edward 
Mason, and thus to an age prior to the one under consideration in this section; we shall 
deal with this in the next section. 
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an industry65, and depends on the existence of exogenous entry 
barriers66; for the latter, it is not a function of the concentration, but of 
the degree of potential competition67, and depends on endogenous and 
exogenous entry barriers. It is useful to notice that these latter are 
strategic barriers, so they imply competitive behavior by the firm, akin 
to the activities to compete found by the classicals and the marginalists 
of whom we spoke in the section on competition.  
 
2.4.2. From the Thirties to the Fifties 
All this is widely known, but less well known is the way in 
which monopoly power was explained before the introduction of the 
category of entry barrier; here we examine the period from the Thirties 
to Bain (1956). The existing historiography on this period68, which is 
not devoted to the specific subject of the sources of market power, 
traced a good many birthplaces of industrial economics. Among them 
we cite only the three that seem to us the most significant: the first is in 
the United Kingdom with J. Robinson (1933), the other two in the 
United States, one at Harvard with E. Chamberlin (1933) and E.S. 
Mason (1939), the other at Chicago with H. Simons (1934). The 
interrelations between the protagonists of these three groups over the 
two decades would deserve an entire study to themselves; here we just 
try to extrapolate the answers they provided to the questions that 
                                                 
65 The degree of concentration provides indications on size (on market share) of firms 
present in an industry. “An industry is concentrated if a small number of firms 
controls a large part of the economic activity of the entire sector” (Grillo and Silva 
1989: 250).  
66 The Chicago School opposed this approach, in particular Demsetz, Posner and 
Friedman, for whom the greater size of firms is a sign of greater efficiency, not market 
power (Martin 2007: 39-43). The same position was taken by the Neo-Austrian School, 
for which “a firm’s market share is not its market power, but a reflection of its overall 
efficiency” (Armentano 1999: 18). 
67 Hence for this approach the number and size of firms are not necessarily correlated 
to market power. 
68 Grillo and Silva (1989: 28-29), Corley (1990), Martin (2007: 27-29), De Jong and 
Shepherd (2007) and the literature cited there. Bain (1948), Galbraith (1948) and 
Keppler (1994a) focused specifically on the two decades examined in this section. 
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interest us, i.e.: are there impediments to entry? Do the firms already 
in an industry have monopoly power?  
To begin with we can state that the controversies between these 
three schools do not seem to be about the specific subject of the 
determinants of market power: represented by some with a downward 
sloping demand curve facing the firm69, monopoly power was 
attributed by everyone to obstacles to entry due both to exogenous 
causes and endogenous factors. It is well known that in the models of 
J. Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin (1933) the finite elasticity of 
demand curve faced by the firm is due to product differentiation; and 
it is likewise well known that this impediment to entry has both 
features, exogenous and endogenous70. On the basis of this theory 
Chamberlin (1937) takes a complex position on free entry71, while J. 
Robinson72 illustrates other examples of limitations on entry, both 
endogenous73 and exogenous 74. And if it is true that Mason seeks the 
                                                 
69 It seems to us that the representation of market power through a downward sloping 
demand curve is already contained in the following words of Sraffa: “This necessity of 
reducing prices in order to sell a larger quantity of one’s own product is only an aspect 
of the usual descending demand curve, with the difference that instead of concerning 
the whole of a commodity, whatever its origin, it relates only to the goods produced 
by a particular firm” (1926: 543). Both Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) use 
downward sloping demand curves for the individual firm, picking up the already well 
known demand curves for a monopoly. Mason (1939) rejects the analytical tools, 
including this representation, on the basis of their being empirically inapplicable. 
70 Shepherd (1991) in actual fact includes in the list of the factors that produce 
exogenous entry barriers “Product differentiation (occurring naturally among 
products)” (53) and in the one for endogenous entry barriers the “Selling expenses, 
including advertising (to increase the degree of product differentiation” (54). 
71 He states in fact that: “With respect to the particular product produced by any 
individual firm under monopolistic competition, there can be no ‘freedom of entry’ 
whatever… [but] there can be freedom of entry only in the sense of a freedom to 
produce substitutes; and in this sense freedom of entry is universal, since substitutes 
are entirely a matter of degree” (Chamberlin 1937: 567, author’s italics). 
72 In her famous book she does not go beyond the observation that “the problem of the 
conditions influencing the entry of new firms … presents an interesting and largely 
unexplored field of inquiry” (Robinson 1933 [1969]: 92, fn. 1), but she does deal with it 
in Robinson (1934). 
73 She writes: “the existing firms may be so strong that they are able to fend off fresh 
competition by the threat of a price war. They may even resort to violence to prevent 
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cause of market power in technological factors75, it is only because he 
believes that these and no others can be found empirically76; on the 
other hand Simons states that firms’ size is determined by exogenous 
factors, such as economies of scale, as well as by endogenous factors77. 
It is not exactly surprising therefore, that Bain in 1956 considered it 
obvious that before him scale economies had been recognized by 
everyone, independently of the school they belonged to, as a deterrent 
to entry78.   
As for the relation between obstacles to entry and monopoly 
power, J. Robinson and Chamberlin both agree that firm’s demand 
curve can be perfectly elastic also in the presence of obstacles to 
entry79, whereas they disagree on the importance of the number of 
firms in determining profit levels80. And, however ironical it may 
seem, Mason, the founder of the structure-behavior-performance 
approach, shows that: “Data on numbers … tell us little regarding 
price and production policies” (1939: 64), whereas Simons (1936), the 
father of the Chicago School, attributes fundamental importance to 
                                                                                                                    
fresh rivals from appearing on the scene” (Robinson 1934: 107). 
74 For Robinson entry is difficult in those industries “which require unusual personal 
ability or special qualifications, such as power to command a large amount of capital 
for the initial investment” (Robinson 1934: 107). 
75 That he calls “market control” (Mason 1939: 61-62). See also Martin (2007: 37). 
76 He writes: “The objection is not that monopoly theory is incompatible with an 
analysis that takes [other] considerations into account but that its constructions are 
irrelevant to the real problems” (Mason 1939: 64). Bain also confirms this (1948 [1953]: 
183). 
77 Martin (2007) argues that if on the one hand at Harvard it was believed that also 
economic forces influenced market structure (32), at Chicago up until the Fifties the 
role of technology was recognized as determining firms’ size (38). 
78 He also points out that, whereas judgment on the large firms due to these economies 
in the UK was positive, the USA (Chicago included) was against concentration (Bain 
1956: 59-61). 
79 The subject is barely mentioned in J. Robinson (1933); “The case of a small number of 
firms selling in a perfect market raises some difficulties, which are not here discussed” 
([1969]: 86, fn.2), whereas in Robinson (1934: 104-111) and in Chamberlin (1937: 566) 
they state that the impediments to entry are entirely compatible with perfect 
competition, on condition that the demand curve for the firm is perfectly elastic. 
80 See J. Robinson (1934: 112-120) and Chamberlin’s reply (1937: 566-568 and 569 fn. 1).  
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firms’ size in the generation of market power (Martin 2007: 33). To 
sum up, and reporting at the same time the situation described by 
Scitovsky in 1950, all of them recognize the existence of both 
exogenous and endogenous impediments to entry81; nevertheless, not 
all believe that they generate monopoly power82. 
It may be argued that this state of affairs was simply due to the 
fact that the problem of the relation between free entry and market 
power had not been fully focused on? This is what the three 
innovators in the theory of oligopoly think, when they complain about 
the confusion reigning in the literature on conditions of entry before 
they appeared on the scene83. Martin’s thesis (2007) nonetheless seems 
to us more convincing; according to this, the real opposition between 
schools of industrial economics only really began from the mid-
Sixties84, after the attacks of the second Chicago School85 (which, again 
                                                 
81 It is worth remembering that, before Bain, Scitovsky (1950) showed a specific 
interest in the sources of market power, and in particular on the role of knowledge as 
entry barrier. 
82 We recall other illustrious names of the age that did not think that large firms 
necessarily had market power, such as J.M. Clark (1940) (cit. in Machovec 1995: 293) 
and above all Schumpeter (1942) (cit. in Sylos Labini 1957 [1962]: 11). 
83 Bain (1956: vi) illustrates how on the subject of “condition of entry” received theory 
was “in extremely rudimentary form”. Also Sylos Labini (1957) writes that “the 
analysis of the relationship between the process of concentration and market form is in 
a completely unsatisfactory state”([1962]: 9). And Modigliani (1958: 216): “little 
systematic attention [had] been paid … to the role of entry, that is, to the behavior of 
potential competitors”. However, Modigliani alludes to a previous literature, though 
without  specifying which, writing that the entry barriers that “Bain labels ‘absolute 
cost advantages’ … have already been extensively analyzed and understood in the 
received body of theory” and that the barrier “resulting from the inability of potential 
competitors to produce a commodity that is a perfect substitute for the product of 
existing firms – is again one that has received considerable attention in the past” 
(Modigliani 1958: 231). It will be remembered that the literature following on from the 
Fifties has always pointed to this period as the point of departure for the thinking on 
the causes of market power. 
84 This seems to us convincing despite the undeniable divergences between imperfect 
and monopolistic competition of which White (1936) speaks. 
85 We are referring to the above cited diatribe on the definition of entry barriers and to 
the attack on the structure-conduct-performance approach by Stigler, Friedman, 
Coase, Posner, etc. 
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according to Martin, the game theory approach finally proved wrong). 
 
2.4.3. Before the Thirties 
If from the historiography on industrial economics indirect 
references to the causes of market power can be drawn, we cannot 
avail ourselves of most of it for the years prior to the Thirties, which is 
considered the pre-history of this discipline. But since it is obvious that 
the ideas of the Thirties did not come from nowhere, we found some 
interesting references in those few works that go further back86. 
Despite the great dissatisfaction often expressed about the state of the 
ideas formulated up until the Thirties on the subject of the causes of 
monopoly power87, we have managed to draw up a list of names who 
are remembered on this.  
In the first place the Scholastics, for whom the causes of 
monopoly were: “engrossing, forestalling, regrating, illicit agreements, 
secret pacts, conspiracies, bidders’ rings”88; there follows that of the 
Dutchman Graswinkel (1651: 158) who argues: “monopoly is not to be 
feared when there are many, but few”89 and of Cantillon (1755) who on 
the contrary argues that the number of competitors is not essential for 
rivalry to occur90. Passing on to the classicals, Smith (1776) is cited by 
this historiography, too, as by that on competition, both for having 
shown that a small number of entrepreneurs facilitates coalitions91, 
and for having highlighted their propensity to come to agreements 
among themselves92; he also identified situations where supply is 
                                                 
86 These works will be cited in the course of this section, the most important being 
those of De Jong and Shepherd (2007). 
87 Sylos Labini (1957) explains for example that, concerning “the market power of very 
large industrial concerns … apart from the rather elementary observations of Smith 
and Marx, we are still in need of a really satisfactory theoretical analysis” ([1962]: 11). 
88 De Jong (2007a : 11, table 2.1). 
89 De Jong (2007a : 22).  
90 De Jong (2007a : 19).  
91  Smith (1776, I. 8. 12 and II. 5. 7) cit. in Sylos Labini (1957 [1962]: 8). 
92 Smith (1776, I. 8. 13, but above all I. 10. 82 and I. 10. 85); he nevertheless believes 
such coalitions to be unstable. Cit. in Stigler (1982: 1).    
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persistently scarce compared to demand93. We have already recalled 
the role attributed by J.S. Mill (1848) to “custom” as a restraint on 
competition94; he is also cited for “the baneful effect of small number 
on the vigor of competition”95 and for his consideration of the 
influence of economies of scale96. There is also Marx (1867), who is 
cited for the idea that the conspicuous “minimum capital necessary to 
start up production at sufficiently low costs … creates a ‘natural’ 
obstacle to competition”97.  
As far as marginalist thinking is concerned, Dupuit (1852-53a 
1852-53b) is remembered for having found some deterrents to entry in 
the transport sector98, C. Menger (1871) for having considered 
monopoly an outcome of the limited size of markets99 and H.C. Adams 
(1887) for the effects on market structure of increasing returns to 
scale100. Marshall deserves a place to himself: on the specific subject of 
monopoly power, on the one hand his anthropomorphic theory of the 
growth of the firm, and the metaphor of the trees of the forest are 
considered as unsuitable to deal with the phenomenon of the big 
industrial concentrations101; in addition, it is stated that his conception 
of competition left no room for long run worries102. On the other hand 
                                                 
93 “Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all 
the land in a great country … may not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand” 
Smith (1776, I. 7. 24) cit. in Mosca (2008: 322). On natural causes see also (I. 7. 20). In 
Smith there are other causes of market power that would require a separate study, for 
example imperfect information on prices, which he considers a temporary cause (I. 7. 
21), and on technologies (I. 7. 22). 
94 J.S. Mill (1848 II. IV. 3) cit. in Sylos Labini (1957 [1962]: 14). 
95 Stigler (1982: 2) and Mosca (2008: 333 and 337). 
96 Stigler (1982: 3). 
97 Marx (1867, I, XXIII, 2) cit. in Sylos Labini (1957 [1962]: 9).  
98 In addition to the works cited in the introduction, see Ekelund and Hébert (1999: 
323). 
99 Niehans (1990: 279), De Jong (2007b: 35). 
100 Hovenkamp (1989a: 123); Trebing (2007: 173- 174). 
101 For example Stigler (1950): “An anthropomorphic theory of the growth of the firm 
… scarcely fits our modern giants” (23) and Sylos Labini: “According to Marshall … 
the trees of the forest must have been saplings once” (1957 [1962]: 169). 
102 According to Chamberlin for Marshall the phenomenon of the “industries in which 
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he is cited on finding the causes of the slope of the firm’s demand 
curve103, as also for the economies of scale due to advertising 
expenditure and for the strategic barriers to entry104. We continue with 
Hadley (1896), remembered for having focused on the importance of 
fixed costs105 and on the effects of the time necessary for new 
competitors to enter the market106, and with Collier (1900) for having 
understood the strategic role of excess capacity107. Ely (1900) is 
remembered for having grasped the monopolistic nature of trade-
marks108, for having stated that the existence of substitutes reduces 
market power109 and that economies of scale are a deterrent to entry110. 
J.B. Clark (1901, 1912, 1914) is remembered for the role he recognizes to 
predatory practices and, with opposite effects on market power, to 
potential competition111. Chamberlin then cites Taussig (1911)112 again 
                                                                                                                    
each firm is likely to be confined more or less to its own particular market” is 
exclusively “short time” (1933 [1962]: 69-70). Similarly Sylos Labini (1957) remembers 
that for Marshall the big industrial enterprises may not have monopoly power and 
cites him: “the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of this have 
shown that even in these cases competition has a much greater force“ ([1962: 12). 
Utton (2007) recalls that: “Marshall continually emphasized the fragile and conditional 
nature of … monopolies. They are perpetually under threat from the vigorous new 
entrant, the alternative source of supply and the substitute product or material” (113). 
103 Joan Robinson writes, citing Marshall: “Its elasticity will depend upon many 
factors, of which the chief are the number of other firms selling the same commodity 
and the degree to which substitution is possible, from the point of view of buyers, 
between the output of other firms and the output of the firm in question. If there are 
few or no other firms producing closely similar commodities, the distribution of 
wealth among buyers, the conditions of supply of rival commodities, the conditions of 
supply of jointly-demanded commodities, and all the innumerable factors which affect 
the demand for any one commodity will influence the demand curve for the 
individual producer” (1933 [1969]: 50). Sylos Labini (1957) comments on this that, 
according to Marshall, with the passing of time “the demand schedule becomes more 
rigid” ([1962]: 51). 
104 Utton (2007: 113-114). 
105 Hovenkamp (1989a: 125). 
106 Hovenkamp (1989a: 151).  
107 Hovenkamp (1989a: 147). 
108 Ely (1900: 43), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 59-60).  
109 Ely (1900: 35), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 66). 
110 Hovenkamp (1989a: 147). 
111 Stigler (1982: 4), Hovenkamp (1989a: 147-148), Brown (2007: 175-176). 
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for the substitutes and Fisher (1912) for the attention he paid “to the 
idea of a separate market for each seller”113. In addition he mentions 
Knight (1921a, 1921b) for the statement that “every business is a partial 
monopoly”114, for the analysis of the effects of “trade-marks, trade 
names, advertising slogans … reputations”115, differentiated 
products116, and for having postulated that in competition small firms 
must be more efficient than large ones117. Chamberlin also cites J.M. 
Clark (1923) for his emphasis on the number of firms118, again on 
product differentiation119 and on excess capacity120. Finally, J. Robinson 
recalls Sraffa (1926) for his saying that “the entry of new firms into an 
imperfect market must necessarily be difficult”121. Chamberlin 
mentions Sraffa for the role of increasing returns122 and cites Hotelling 
(1929) both for the “circles of customers [who] make every 
entrepreneur a monopolist within a limited class and region”, and for 
the statement that at the same time “there is no monopoly which is not 
confined to a limited class or region”123.  
As can be seen the list is not a short one and the causes of 
monopoly power are all there, exogenous and endogenous: strategies, 
economies of scale, absolute cost advantages, product differentiation, 
conditions of demand (elasticity and market size); there is also the idea 
                                                                                                                    
112 Taussig (1911, 3rd rev. ed., I: 209 and II: 114) cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 66). 
113 Fisher (1912: 323) cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 69). 
114 Knight (1921b: 193 [1960]: 184 fn. 1), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 5)   
115 Knight (1921b: 185 [1960]: 176 fn. 1), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 60). 
116 Knight (1921a: 332), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 70). 
117 Knight (1921b: 98 [1960]: 93), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 245). 
118 J.M.Clark (1923: 417), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 49). 
119 J.M.Clark (1923: 418), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 70). 
120 J.M.Clark (1923: 437-439), cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 109); it is also cit. in 
Hovenkamp (1989a: 148). 
121 J. Robinson (1934 : 105). 
122 Chamberlin (1933 [1962] : 5). Sraffa’s article of 1926 is cited by all the literature. In 
particular it seems to us of interest to recall that Sraffa (1926) assimilates to a 
monopoly the firm that spends on advertising, thanks to the “protection of its own 
barrier” (545). 
123 Hotelling (1929: 44) cit. in Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 6). 
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that the number of firms may not affect market power or even that the 
entry barriers in the long run may not be there at all. But the things 
that the examined literature says about the authors of the past 
concerning the uncovering of the causes of monopoly power are only 
vague and random fragments, lacking a background of systematic 
study or interpretation.  
 
3. Where to search 
Despite the wealth of suggestions we have highlighted so far, the 
historiography on the period prior to the Thirties has never focused on 
the subject of the causes of market power, thereby leaving a gap that 
requires filling. In the light of the review we have just carried out of 
the literature on competition on the one hand and on the pre-history of 
industrial economics on the other, we may well ask ourselves at this 
point in which direction we should be concentrating our research. 
 
3.1. Why not begin with the Classicals? 
As we have seen, the information we have gathered from the 
secondary literature tells us that the causes found by the classicals 
were in part endogenous, due to strategies carried out in order to 
compete, and in part exogenous, the fruit of obstacles independent of 
the firms intentions. These obstacles, we have argued, were held to be 
mainly short run124; in actual fact the literature insistently recalls that 
in classical thinking restraints on competition had no importance in 
the long run125. The monopoly power resulting from competitive 
                                                 
124 The term “mainly” refers to the fact that, for example for Smith, certain factors of 
production could be scarce “forever” (Smith 1776: I.7.24); J.S. Mill also believed that 
certain obstacles would last in the long run: for example custom, and the combinations 
(Schumpeter 1954 [1976]: 546), and also natural monopolies (Mosca 2008).  
125 Hovenkamp (1989a): “The analysis of classical political economists generally 
assumed that entry into markets was easy and could be accomplished very quickly” 
(144, italics ours). Machovec (1995): “From a classical view … harm ensued only if 
institutions existed  to inhibit the process of competition, independent of the presence 
of transitory monopoly profits due to P > MC” (17, our italics). 
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